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Again, some things are one in number, others in species, others in
genus, others by analogy; in number those whose matter is one, in
species those whose definition is one, in genus those to which the
same figure of predication applies, by analogy those which are related
as a third thing is to a fourth. The latter kinds of unity are
always found when the former are; e.g. things that are one in number
are also one in species, while things that are one in species are
not all one in number; but things that are one in species are all
one in genus, while things that are so in genus are not all one in
species but are all one by analogy; while things that are one by
analogy are not all one in genus.
Evidently 'many' will have meanings opposite to those of 'one';
some things are many because they are not continuous, others because
their matter-either the proximate matter or the ultimate-is
divisible in kind, others because the definitions which state their
essence are more than one.
7
Things are said to 'be' (1) in an accidental sense, (2) by their
own nature.
(1) In an accidental sense, e.g. we say 'the righteous doer is
musical', and 'the man is musical', and 'the musician is a man',
just as we say 'the musician builds', because the builder happens to
be musical or the musician to be a builder; for here 'one thing is
another' means 'one is an accident of another'
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