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Aristotle - Metaphysics
Atec Февраль 16 2008 19:57:08
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. So in the cases we
have mentioned; for when we say 'the man is musical' and 'the musician
is a man', or 'he who is pale is musical' or 'the musician is pale',
the last two mean that both attributes are accidents of the same
thing; the first that the attribute is an accident of that which is,
while 'the musical is a man' means that 'musical' is an accident of
a man. (In this sense, too, the not-pale is said to be, because that
of which it is an accident is.) Thus when one thing is said in an
accidental sense to be another, this is either because both belong
to the same thing, and this is, or because that to which the attribute
belongs is, or because the subject which has as an attribute that of
which it is itself predicated, itself is.
(2) The kinds of essential being are precisely those that are
indicated by the figures of predication; for the senses of 'being' are
just as many as these figures. Since, then, some predicates indicate
what the subject is, others its quality, others quantity, others
relation, others activity or passivity, others its 'where', others its
'when', 'being' has a meaning answering to each of these. For there is
no difference between 'the man is recovering' and 'the man
recovers', nor between 'the man is walking or cutting' and 'the man
walks' or 'cuts'; and similarly in all other cases.
(3) Again, 'being' and 'is' mean that a statement is true, 'not
being' that it is not true but falses-and this alike in the case of
affirmation and of negation; e
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