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Aristotle - Metaphysics
Atec Февраль 16 2008 19:57:08
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. For
'Socrates' and 'musical Socrates' are thought to be the same; but
'Socrates' is not predicable of more than one subject, and therefore
we do not say 'every Socrates' as we say 'every man'.
Some things are said to be the same in this sense, others (2)
are the same by their own nature, in as many senses as that which is
one by its own nature is so; for both the things whose matter is one
either in kind or in number, and those whose essence is one, are
said to be the same. Clearly, therefore, sameness is a unity of the
being either of more than one thing or of one thing when it is treated
as more than one, ie. when we say a thing is the same as itself; for
we treat it as two.
Things are called 'other' if either their kinds or their matters
or the definitions of their essence are more than one; and in
general 'other' has meanings opposite to those of 'the same'.
'Different' is applied (1) to those things which though other
are the same in some respect, only not in number but either in species
or in genus or by analogy; (2) to those whose genus is other, and to
contraries, and to an things that have their otherness in their
essence.
Those things are called 'like' which have the same attributes in
every respect, and those which have more attributes the same than
different, and those whose quality is one; and that which shares
with another thing the greater number or the more important of the
attributes (each of them one of two contraries) in respect of which
things are capable of altering, is like that other thing
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