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Aristotle - Metaphysics
Atec Февраль 16 2008 19:57:08
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'Potency' having this variety of meanings, so too the 'potent'
or 'capable' in one sense will mean that which can begin a movement
(or a change in general, for even that which can bring things to
rest is a 'potent' thing) in another thing or in itself qua other; and
in one sense that over which something else has such a potency; and in
one sense that which has a potency of changing into something, whether
for the worse or for the better (for even that which perishes is
thought to be 'capable' of perishing, for it would not have perished
if it had not been capable of it; but, as a matter of fact, it has a
certain disposition and cause and principle which fits it to suffer
this; sometimes it is thought to be of this sort because it has
something, sometimes because it is deprived of something; but if
privation is in a sense 'having' or 'habit', everything will be
capable by having something, so that things are capable both by having
a positive habit and principle, and by having the privation of this,
if it is possible to have a privation; and if privation is not in a
sense 'habit', 'capable' is used in two distinct senses); and a
thing is capable in another sense because neither any other thing, nor
itself qua other, has a potency or principle which can destroy it.
Again, all of these are capable either merely because the thing
might chance to happen or not to happen, or because it might do so
well
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