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Aristotle - Metaphysics
Atec Февраль 16 2008 19:57:08
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. For it must be either by an equivocation that we say
these are, or by adding to and taking from the meaning of 'are' (in
the way in which that which is not known may be said to be known),-the
truth being that we use the word neither ambiguously nor in the same
sense, but just as we apply the word 'medical' by virtue of a
reference to one and the same thing, not meaning one and the same
thing, nor yet speaking ambiguously; for a patient and an operation
and an instrument are called medical neither by an ambiguity nor
with a single meaning, but with reference to a common end. But it does
not matter at all in which of the two ways one likes to describe the
facts; this is evident, that definition and essence in the primary and
simple sense belong to substances. Still they belong to other things
as well, only not in the primary sense. For if we suppose this it does
not follow that there is a definition of every word which means the
same as any formula; it must mean the same as a particular kind of
formula; and this condition is satisfied if it is a formula of
something which is one, not by continuity like the Iliad or the things
that are one by being bound together, but in one of the main senses of
'one', which answer to the senses of 'is'; now 'that which is' in
one sense denotes a 'this', in another a quantity, in another a
quality. And so there can be a formula or definition even of white
man, but not in the sense in which there is a definition either of
white or of a substance
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