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Aristotle - Metaphysics
Atec Февраль 16 2008 19:57:08
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. And so it is absurd that such things should have an essence;
if they have, there will be an infinite regress; for in snub-nose nose
yet another 'nose' will be involved.
Clearly, then, only substance is definable. For if the other
categories also are definable, it must be by addition of a
determinant, e.g. the qualitative is defined thus, and so is the
odd, for it cannot be defined apart from number; nor can female be
defined apart from animal. (When I say 'by addition' I mean the
expressions in which it turns out that we are saying the same thing
twice, as in these instances.) And if this is true, coupled terms
also, like 'odd number', will not be definable (but this escapes our
notice because our formulae are not accurate.). But if these also
are definable, either it is in some other way or, as we definition and
essence must be said to have more than one sense. Therefore in one
sense nothing will have a definition and nothing will have an essence,
except substances, but in another sense other things will have them.
Clearly, then, definition is the formula of the essence, and essence
belongs to substances either alone or chiefly and primarily and in the
unqualified sense.
6
We must inquire whether each thing and its essence are the same or
different. This is of some use for the inquiry concerning substance;
for each thing is thought to be not different from its substance,
and the essence is said to be the substance of each thing
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