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Aristotle - Metaphysics
Atec Февраль 16 2008 19:57:08
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What the essence is and in what sense it is independent, has
been stated universally in a way which is true of every case, and also
why the formula of the essence of some things contains the parts of
the thing defined, while that of others does not. And we have stated
that in the formula of the substance the material parts will not be
present (for they are not even parts of the substance in that sense,
but of the concrete substance; but of this there is in a sense a
formula, and in a sense there is not; for there is no formula of it
with its matter, for this is indefinite, but there is a formula of
it with reference to its primary substance-e.g. in the case of man the
formula of the soul-, for the substance is the indwelling form, from
which and the matter the so-called concrete substance is derived; e.g.
concavity is a form of this sort, for from this and the nose arise
'snub nose' and 'snubness'); but in the concrete substance, e.g. a
snub nose or Callias, the matter also will be present. And we have
stated that the essence and the thing itself are in some cases the
same; ie. in the case of primary substances, e.g. curvature and the
essence of curvature if this is primary. (By a 'primary' substance I
mean one which does not imply the presence of something in something
else, i.e. in something that underlies it which acts as matter.) But
things which are of the nature of matter, or of wholes that include
matter, are not the same as their essences, nor are accidental unities
like that of 'Socrates' and 'musical'; for these are the same only
by accident
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