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Aristotle - Metaphysics
Atec Февраль 16 2008 19:57:08
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.g. animal + biped, especially if there are, as some
say, an animal-itself and a biped-itself? Why are not those Forms
themselves the man, so that men would exist by participation not in
man, nor in-one Form, but in two, animal and biped, and in general man
would be not one but more than one thing, animal and biped?
Clearly, then, if people proceed thus in their usual manner of
definition and speech, they cannot explain and solve the difficulty.
But if, as we say, one element is matter and another is form, and
one is potentially and the other actually, the question will no longer
be thought a difficulty. For this difficulty is the same as would
arise if 'round bronze' were the definition of 'cloak'; for this
word would be a sign of the definitory formula, so that the question
is, what is the cause of the unity of 'round' and 'bronze'? The
difficulty disappears, because the one is matter, the other form.
What, then, causes this-that which was potentially to be
actually-except, in the case of things which are generated, the agent?
For there is no other cause of the potential sphere's becoming
actually a sphere, but this was the essence of either. Of matter
some is intelligible, some perceptible, and in a formula there is
always an element of matter as well as one of actuality; e.g. the
circle is 'a plane figure'. But of the things which have no matter,
either intelligible or perceptible, each is by its nature
essentially a kind of unity, as it is essentially a kind of
being-individual substance, quality, or quantity (and so neither
'existent' nor 'one' is present in their definitions), and the essence
of each of them is by its very nature a kind of unity as it is a
kind of being-and so none of these has any reason outside itself,
for being one, nor for being a kind of being; for each is by its
nature a kind of being and a kind of unity, not as being in the
genus 'being' or 'one' nor in the sense that being and unity can exist
apart from particulars
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