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Aristotle - Metaphysics
Atec Февраль 16 2008 19:57:08
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.e. of substance. For it is in
virtue of the concept of substance that the others also are said to
be-quantity and quality and the like; for all will be found to involve
the concept of substance, as we said in the first part of our work.
And since 'being' is in one way divided into individual thing,
quality, and quantity, and is in another way distinguished in
respect of potency and complete reality, and of function, let us now
add a discussion of potency and complete reality. And first let us
explain potency in the strictest sense, which is, however, not the
most useful for our present purpose. For potency and actuality
extend beyond the cases that involve a reference to motion. But when
we have spoken of this first kind, we shall in our discussions of
actuality' explain the other kinds of potency as well.
We have pointed out elsewhere that 'potency' and the word 'can'
have several senses. Of these we may neglect all the potencies that
are so called by an equivocation. For some are called so by analogy,
as in geometry we say one thing is or is not a 'power' of another by
virtue of the presence or absence of some relation between them. But
all potencies that conform to the same type are originative sources of
some kind, and are called potencies in reference to one primary kind
of potency, which is an originative source of change in another
thing or in the thing itself qua other
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