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Aristotle - Metaphysics
Atec Февраль 16 2008 19:57:08
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. But, indeed, nothing will even
have perception if it is not perceiving, i.e. exercising its
perception. If, then, that is blind which has not sight though it
would naturally have it, when it would naturally have it and when it
still exists, the same people will be blind many times in the
day-and deaf too.
Again, if that which is deprived of potency is incapable, that
which is not happening will be incapable of happening; but he who says
of that which is incapable of happening either that it is or that it
will be will say what is untrue; for this is what incapacity meant.
Therefore these views do away with both movement and becoming. For
that which stands will always stand, and that which sits will always
sit, since if it is sitting it will not get up; for that which, as
we are told, cannot get up will be incapable of getting up. But we
cannot say this, so that evidently potency and actuality are different
(but these views make potency and actuality the same, and so it is
no small thing they are seeking to annihilate), so that it is possible
that a thing may be capable of being and not he, and capable of not
being and yet he, and similarly with the other kinds of predicate;
it may be capable of walking and yet not walk, or capable of not
walking and yet walk. And a thing is capable of doing something if
there will be nothing impossible in its having the actuality of that
of which it is said to have the capacity
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