:
Aristotle - Metaphysics
Atec Февраль 16 2008 19:57:08
Книга только для ознакомления
. And similarly if all existent things
had been articulate sounds, they would have been a number of
letters, and the one would have been a vowel. And if all existent
things were rectilinear figures, they would have been a number of
figures, and the one would have been the triangle. And the same
argument applies to all other classes. Since, therefore, while there
are numbers and a one both in affections and in qualities and in
quantities and in movement, in all cases the number is a number of
particular things and the one is one something, and its substance is
not just to be one, the same must be true of substances also; for it
is true of all cases alike.
That the one, then, in every class is a definite thing, and in
no case is its nature just this, unity, is evident; but as in
colours the one-itself which we must seek is one colour, so too in
substance the one-itself is one substance. That in a sense unity means
the same as being is clear from the facts that its meanings correspond
to the categories one to one, and it is not comprised within any
category (e.g. it is comprised neither in 'what a thing is' nor in
quality, but is related to them just as being is); that in 'one man'
nothing more is predicated than in 'man' (just as being is nothing
apart from substance or quality or quantity); and that to be one is
just to be a particular thing.
3
The one and the many are opposed in several ways, of which one
is the opposition of the one and plurality as indivisible and
divisible; for that which is either divided or divisible is called a
plurality, and that which is indivisible or not divided is called one
: