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Aristotle - Metaphysics
Atec Февраль 16 2008 19:57:08
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6
We might raise similar questions about the one and the many. For
if the many are absolutely opposed to the one, certain impossible
results follow. One will then be few, whether few be treated here as
singular or plural; for the many are opposed also to the few. Further,
two will be many, since the double is multiple and 'double' derives
its meaning from 'two'; therefore one will be few; for what is that in
comparison with which two are many, except one, which must therefore
be few? For there is nothing fewer. Further, if the much and the
little are in plurality what the long and the short are in length, and
whatever is much is also many, and the many are much (unless,
indeed, there is a difference in the case of an easily-bounded
continuum), the little (or few) will be a plurality. Therefore one
is a plurality if it is few; and this it must be, if two are many. But
perhaps, while the 'many' are in a sense said to be also 'much', it is
with a difference; e.g. water is much but not many. But 'many' is
applied to the things that are divisible; in the one sense it means
a plurality which is excessive either absolutely or relatively
(while 'few' is similarly a plurality which is deficient), and in
another sense it means number, in which sense alone it is opposed to
the one. For we say 'one or many', just as if one were to say 'one and
ones' or 'white thing and white things', or to compare the things that
have been measured with the measure
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