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Aristotle - Metaphysics
Atec Февраль 16 2008 19:57:08
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. It is in this sense also that
multiples are so called. For each number is said to be many because it
consists of ones and because each number is measurable by one; and
it is 'many' as that which is opposed to one, not to the few. In
this sense, then, even two is many-not, however, in the sense of a
plurality which is excessive either relatively or absolutely; it is
the first plurality. But without qualification two is few; for it is
first plurality which is deficient (for this reason Anaxagoras was not
right in leaving the subject with the statement that 'all things
were together, boundless both in plurality and in smallness'-where for
'and in smallness' he should have said 'and in fewness'; for they
could not have been boundless in fewness), since it is not one, as
some say, but two, that make a few.
The one is opposed then to the many in numbers as measure to thing
measurable; and these are opposed as are the relatives which are not
from their very nature relatives. We have distinguished elsewhere
the two senses in which relatives are so called:-(1) as contraries;
(2) as knowledge to thing known, a term being called relative
because another is relative to it. There is nothing to prevent one
from being fewer than something, e.g. than two; for if one is fewer,
it is not therefore few. Plurality is as it were the class to which
number belongs; for number is plurality measurable by one, and one and
number are in a sense opposed, not as contrary, but as we have said
some relative terms are opposed; for inasmuch as one is measure and
the other measurable, they are opposed
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