:
Aristotle - Metaphysics
Atec Февраль 16 2008 19:57:08
Книга только для ознакомления
. But if there is one principle of
perishable and another of eternal things, we shall be in a like
difficulty if the principle of perishable things, as well as that of
eternal, is eternal; for why, if the principle is eternal, are not the
things that fall under the principle also eternal? But if it is
perishable another principle is involved to account for it, and
another to account for that, and this will go on to infinity.
If on the other hand we are to set up what are thought to be the
most unchangeable principles, being and unity, firstly, if each of
these does not indicate a 'this' or substance, how will they be
separable and independent? Yet we expect the eternal and primary
principles to be so. But if each of them does signify a 'this' or
substance, all things that are are substances; for being is predicated
of all things (and unity also of some); but that all things that are
are substance is false. Further, how can they be right who say that
the first principle is unity and this is substance, and generate
number as the first product from unity and from matter, assert that
number is substance? How are we to think of 'two', and each of the
other numbers composed of units, as one? On this point neither do they
say anything nor is it easy to say anything. But if we are to
suppose lines or what comes after these (I mean the primary
surfaces) to be principles, these at least are not separable
substances, but sections and divisions-the former of surfaces, the
latter of bodies (while points are sections and divisions of lines);
and further they are limits of these same things; and all these are in
other things and none is separable
: