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Aristotle - Metaphysics
Atec Февраль 16 2008 19:57:08
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7
Every science seeks certain principles and causes for each of
its objects-e.g. medicine and gymnastics and each of the other
sciences, whether productive or mathematical. For each of these
marks off a certain class of things for itself and busies itself about
this as about something existing and real,-not however qua real; the
science that does this is another distinct from these. Of the sciences
mentioned each gets somehow the 'what' in some class of things and
tries to prove the other truths, with more or less precision. Some get
the 'what' through perception, others by hypothesis; so that it is
clear from an induction of this sort that there is no demonstration.
of the substance or 'what'.
There is a science of nature, and evidently it must be different
both from practical and from productive science. For in the case of
productive science the principle of movement is in the producer and
not in the product, and is either an art or some other faculty. And
similarly in practical science the movement is not in the thing
done, but rather in the doers. But the science of the natural
philosopher deals with the things that have in themselves a
principle of movement. It is clear from these facts, then, that
natural science must be neither practical nor productive, but
theoretical (for it must fall into some one of these classes). And
since each of the sciences must somehow know the 'what' and use this
as a principle, we must not fall to observe how the natural
philosopher should define things and how he should state the
definition of the essence-whether as akin to 'snub' or rather to
'concave'
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