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Aristotle - Metaphysics
Atec Февраль 16 2008 19:57:08
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One might raise the question whether the science of being qua
being is to be regarded as universal or not. Each of the
mathematical sciences deals with some one determinate class of things,
but universal mathematics applies alike to all. Now if natural
substances are the first of existing things, physics must be the first
of sciences; but if there is another entity and substance, separable
and unmovable, the knowledge of it must be different and prior to
physics and universal because it is prior.
8
Since 'being' in general has several senses, of which one is
'being by accident', we must consider first that which 'is' in this
sense. Evidently none of the traditional sciences busies itself
about the accidental. For neither does architecture consider what will
happen to those who are to use the house (e.g. whether they have a
painful life in it or not), nor does weaving, or shoemaking, or the
confectioner's art, do the like; but each of these sciences
considers only what is peculiar to it, i.e. its proper end. And as for
the argument that 'when he who is musical becomes lettered he'll be
both at once, not having been both before; and that which is, not
always having been, must have come to be; therefore he must have at
once become musical and lettered',-this none of the recognized
sciences considers, but only sophistic; for this alone busies itself
about the accidental, so that Plato is not far wrong when he says that
the sophist spends his time on non-being
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