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Aristotle - Metaphysics
Atec Февраль 16 2008 19:57:08
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. If,
then, that which is posterior in the order of generation is prior in
the order of substantiality, the solid will be prior to the plane
and the line. And in this way also it is both more complete and more
whole, because it can become animate. How, on the other hand, could
a line or a plane be animate? The supposition passes the power of
our senses.
Again, the solid is a sort of substance; for it already has in a
sense completeness. But how can lines be substances? Neither as a form
or shape, as the soul perhaps is, nor as matter, like the solid; for
we have no experience of anything that can be put together out of
lines or planes or points, while if these had been a sort of
material substance, we should have observed things which could be
put together out of them.
Grant, then, that they are prior in definition. Still not all
things that are prior in definition are also prior in
substantiality. For those things are prior in substantiality which
when separated from other things surpass them in the power of
independent existence, but things are prior in definition to those
whose definitions are compounded out of their definitions; and these
two properties are not coextensive. For if attributes do not exist
apart from the substances (e.g. a 'mobile' or a pale'), pale is
prior to the pale man in definition, but not in substantiality. For it
cannot exist separately, but is always along with the concrete
thing; and by the concrete thing I mean the pale man
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