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Aristotle - Metaphysics
Atec Февраль 16 2008 19:57:08
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In general, though philosophy seeks the cause of perceptible
things, we have given this up (for we say nothing of the cause from
which change takes its start), but while we fancy we are stating the
substance of perceptible things, we assert the existence of a second
class of substances, while our account of the way in which they are
the substances of perceptible things is empty talk; for 'sharing',
as we said before, means nothing.
Nor have the Forms any connexion with what we see to be the
cause in the case of the arts, that for whose sake both all mind and
the whole of nature are operative,-with this cause which we assert
to be one of the first principles; but mathematics has come to be
identical with philosophy for modern thinkers, though they say that it
should be studied for the sake of other things. Further, one might
suppose that the substance which according to them underlies as matter
is too mathematical, and is a predicate and differentia of the
substance, ie. of the matter, rather than matter itself; i.e. the
great and the small are like the rare and the dense which the physical
philosophers speak of, calling these the primary differentiae of the
substratum; for these are a kind of excess and defect. And regarding
movement, if the great and the small are to he movement, evidently the
Forms will be moved; but if they are not to be movement, whence did
movement come? The whole study of nature has been annihilated
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