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Aristotle - Metaphysics
Atec Февраль 16 2008 19:57:08
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. How
then is 1 the starting-point? Because it is not divisiable, they
say; but both the universal, and the particular or the element, are
indivisible. But they are starting-points in different ways, one in
definition and the other in time. In which way, then, is 1 the
starting-point? As has been said, the right angle is thought to be
prior to the acute, and the acute to the right, and each is one.
Accordingly they make 1 the starting-point in both ways. But this is
impossible. For the universal is one as form or substance, while the
element is one as a part or as matter. For each of the two is in a
sense one-in truth each of the two units exists potentially (at
least if the number is a unity and not like a heap, i.e. if
different numbers consist of differentiated units, as they say), but
not in complete reality; and the cause of the error they fell into
is that they were conducting their inquiry at the same time from the
standpoint of mathematics and from that of universal definitions, so
that (1) from the former standpoint they treated unity, their first
principle, as a point; for the unit is a point without position.
They put things together out of the smallest parts, as some others
also have done. Therefore the unit becomes the matter of numbers and
at the same time prior to 2; and again posterior, 2 being treated as a
whole, a unity, and a form. But (2) because they were seeking the
universal they treated the unity which can be predicated of a
number, as in this sense also a part of the number
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