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Aristotle - Metaphysics
Atec Февраль 16 2008 19:57:08
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.-And at the same time our discussion with him
is evidently about nothing at all; for he says nothing. For he says
neither 'yes' nor 'no', but 'yes and no'; and again he denies both
of these and says 'neither yes nor no'; for otherwise there would
already be something definite.
Again if when the assertion is true, the negation is false, and
when this is true, the affirmation is false, it will not be possible
to assert and deny the same thing truly at the same time. But
perhaps they might say this was the very question at issue.
Again, is he in error who judges either that the thing is so or
that it is not so, and is he right who judges both? If he is right,
what can they mean by saying that the nature of existing things is
of this kind? And if he is not right, but more right than he who
judges in the other way, being will already be of a definite nature,
and this will be true, and not at the same time also not true. But
if all are alike both wrong and right, one who is in this condition
will not be able either to speak or to say anything intelligible;
for he says at the same time both 'yes' and 'no.' And if he makes no
judgement but 'thinks' and 'does not think', indifferently, what
difference will there be between him and a vegetable?-Thus, then, it
is in the highest degree evident that neither any one of those who
maintain this view nor any one else is really in this position
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