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. And
if the Ideas and the things that share in them have the same form,
there will be something common: for why should '2' be one and the same
in the perishable 2's, or in the 2's which are many but eternal, and
not the same in the '2 itself' as in the individual 2? But if they
have not the same form, they will have only the name in common, and it
is as if one were to call both Callias and a piece of wood a 'man',
without observing any community between them.
But if we are to suppose that in other respects the common
definitions apply to the Forms, e.g. that 'plane figure' and the other
parts of the definition apply to the circle itself, but 'what really
is' has to be added, we must inquire whether this is not absolutely
meaningless. For to what is this to be added? To 'centre' or to
'plane' or to all the parts of the definition? For all the elements in
the essence are Ideas, e.g. 'animal' and 'two-footed'. Further,
there must be some Ideal answering to 'plane' above, some nature which
will be present in all the Forms as their genus.
5
Above all one might discuss the question what in the world the
Forms contribute to sensible things, either to those that are
eternal or to those that come into being and cease to be; for they
cause neither movement nor any change in them. But again they help
in no wise either towards the knowledge of other things (for they
are not even the substance of these, else they would have been in
them), or towards their being, if they are not in the individuals
which share in them; though if they were, they might be thought to
be causes, as white causes whiteness in a white object by entering
into its composition
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