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There are some who describe the element which acts with the One as
an indefinite dyad, and object to 'the unequal', reasonably enough,
because of the ensuing difficulties; but they have got rid only of
those objections which inevitably arise from the treatment of the
unequal, i.e. the relative, as an element; those which arise apart
from this opinion must confront even these thinkers, whether it is
ideal number, or mathematical, that they construct out of those
elements.
There are many causes which led them off into these
explanations, and especially the fact that they framed the
difficulty in an obsolete form. For they thought that all things
that are would be one (viz. Being itself), if one did not join issue
with and refute the saying of Parmenides:
'For never will this he proved, that things that are not are.'
They thought it necessary to prove that that which is not is;
for only thus-of that which is and something else-could the things
that are be composed, if they are many.
But, first, if 'being' has many senses (for it means sometimes
substance, sometimes that it is of a certain quality, sometimes that
it is of a certain quantity, and at other times the other categories),
what sort of 'one', then, are all the things that are, if non-being is
to be supposed not to be? Is it the substances that are one, or the
affections and similarly the other categories as well, or all
together-so that the 'this' and the 'such' and the 'so much' and the
other categories that indicate each some one class of being will all
be one? But it is strange, or rather impossible, that the coming
into play of a single thing should bring it about that part of that
which is is a 'this', part a 'such', part a 'so much', part a 'here'
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