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. Nothing, then, which is not a species of a genus will
have an essence-only species will have it, for these are thought to
imply not merely that the subject participates in the attribute and
has it as an affection, or has it by accident; but for ever thing else
as well, if it has a name, there be a formula of its meaning-viz. that
this attribute belongs to this subject; or instead of a simple formula
we shall be able to give a more accurate one; but there will be no
definition nor essence.
Or has 'definition', like 'what a thing is', several meanings?
'What a thing is' in one sense means substance and the 'this', in
another one or other of the predicates, quantity, quality, and the
like. For as 'is' belongs to all things, not however in the same
sense, but to one sort of thing primarily and to others in a secondary
way, so too 'what a thing is' belongs in the simple sense to
substance, but in a limited sense to the other categories. For even of
a quality we might ask what it is, so that quality also is a 'what a
thing is',-not in the simple sense, however, but just as, in the
case of that which is not, some say, emphasizing the linguistic
form, that that is which is not is-not is simply, but is non-existent;
so too with quality.
We must no doubt inquire how we should express ourselves on each
point, but certainly not more than how the facts actually stand. And
so now also, since it is evident what language we use, essence will
belong, just as 'what a thing is' does, primarily and in the simple
sense to substance, and in a secondary way to the other categories
also,-not essence in the simple sense, but the essence of a quality or
of a quantity
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