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(But of an accidental term, e.g.'the musical' or 'the white',
since it has two meanings, it is not true to say that it itself is
identical with its essence; for both that to which the accidental
quality belongs, and the accidental quality, are white, so that in a
sense the accident and its essence are the same, and in a sense they
are not; for the essence of white is not the same as the man or the
white man, but it is the same as the attribute white.)
The absurdity of the separation would appear also if one were to
assign a name to each of the essences; for there would be yet
another essence besides the original one, e.g. to the essence of horse
there will belong a second essence. Yet why should not some things
be their essences from the start, since essence is substance? But
indeed not only are a thing and its essence one, but the formula of
them is also the same, as is clear even from what has been said; for
it is not by accident that the essence of one, and the one, are one.
Further, if they are to be different, the process will go on to
infinity; for we shall have (1) the essence of one, and (2) the one,
so that to terms of the former kind the same argument will be
applicable.
Clearly, then, each primary and self-subsistent thing is one and
the same as its essence. The sophistical objections to this
position, and the question whether Socrates and to be Socrates are the
same thing, are obviously answered by the same solution; for there
is no difference either in the standpoint from which the question
would be asked, or in that from which one could answer it
successfully
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