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That, then, which is capable of being may either be or not be; the
same thing, then, is capable both of being and of not being. And
that which is capable of not being may possibly not be; and that which
may possibly not be is perishable, either in the full sense, or in the
precise sense in which it is said that it possibly may not be, i.e. in
respect either of place or of quantity or quality; 'in the full sense'
means 'in respect of substance'. Nothing, then, which is in the full
sense imperishable is in the full sense potentially existent (though
there is nothing to prevent its being so in some respect, e.g.
potentially of a certain quality or in a certain place); all
imperishable things, then, exist actually. Nor can anything which is
of necessity exist potentially; yet these things are primary; for if
these did not exist, nothing would exist. Nor does eternal movement,
if there be such, exist potentially; and, if there is an eternal
mobile, it is not in motion in virtue of a potentiality, except in
respect of 'whence' and 'whither' (there is nothing to prevent its
having matter which makes it capable of movement in various
directions). And so the sun and the stars and the whole heaven are
ever active, and there is no fear that they may sometime stand
still, as the natural philosophers fear they may. Nor do they tire
in this activity; for movement is not for them, as it is for
perishable things, connected with the potentiality for opposites, so
that the continuity of the movement should be laborious; for it is
that kind of substance which is matter and potency, not actuality,
that causes this
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