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. Therefore
everything which has a rational potency, when it desires that for
which it has a potency and in the circumstances in which it has the
potency, must do this. And it has the potency in question when the
passive object is present and is in a certain state; if not it will
not be able to act. (To add the qualification 'if nothing external
prevents it' is not further necessary; for it has the potency on the
terms on which this is a potency of acting, and it is this not in
all circumstances but on certain conditions, among which will be the
exclusion of external hindrances; for these are barred by some of
the positive qualifications.) And so even if one has a rational
wish, or an appetite, to do two things or contrary things at the
same time, one will not do them; for it is not on these terms that one
has the potency for them, nor is it a potency of doing both at the
same time, since one will do the things which it is a potency of
doing, on the terms on which one has the potency.
6
Since we have treated of the kind of potency which is related to
movement, let us discuss actuality-what, and what kind of thing,
actuality is. For in the course of our analysis it will also become
clear, with regard to the potential, that we not only ascribe
potency to that whose nature it is to move something else, or to be
moved by something else, either without qualification or in some
particular way, but also use the word in another sense, which is the
reason of the inquiry in the course of which we have discussed these
previous senses also
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