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.g. the buildable qua buildable; and
the actuality of the buildable qua buildable is building. For the
actuality is either this-the act of building-or the house. But when
the house exists, it is no longer buildable; the buildable is what
is being built. The actuality, then, must be the act of building,
and this is a movement. And the same account applies to all other
movements.
That what we have said is right is evident from what all others
say about movement, and from the fact that it is not easy to define it
otherwise. For firstly one cannot put it in any class. This is evident
from what people say. Some call it otherness and inequality and the
unreal; none of these, however, is necessarily moved, and further,
change is not either to these or from these any more than from their
opposites. The reason why people put movement in these classes is that
it is thought to be something indefinite, and the principles in one of
the two 'columns of contraries' are indefinite because they are
privative, for none of them is either a 'this' or a 'such' or in any
of the other categories. And the reason why movement is thought to
be indefinite is that it cannot be classed either with the potency
of things or with their actuality; for neither that which is capable
of being of a certain quantity, nor that which is actually of a
certain quantity, is of necessity moved, and movement is thought to be
an actuality, but incomplete; the reason is that the potential,
whose actuality it is, is incomplete
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