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Secondly, there would evidently be something else more precious than
thought, viz. that which is thought of. For both thinking and the
act of thought will belong even to one who thinks of the worst thing
in the world, so that if this ought to be avoided (and it ought, for
there are even some things which it is better not to see than to see),
the act of thinking cannot be the best of things. Therefore it must be
of itself that the divine thought thinks (since it is the most
excellent of things), and its thinking is a thinking on thinking.
But evidently knowledge and perception and opinion and
understanding have always something else as their object, and
themselves only by the way. Further, if thinking and being thought
of are different, in respect of which does goodness belong to thought?
For to he an act of thinking and to he an object of thought are not
the same thing. We answer that in some cases the knowledge is the
object. In the productive sciences it is the substance or essence of
the object, matter omitted, and in the theoretical sciences the
definition or the act of thinking is the object. Since, then,
thought and the object of thought are not different in the case of
things that have not matter, the divine thought and its object will be
the same, i.e. the thinking will be one with the object of its
thought.
A further question is left-whether the object of the divine
thought is composite; for if it were, thought would change in
passing from part to part of the whole
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