Книга только для ознакомления
. What
difference, then, does it make whether sensible things are such
indivisible entities, or, without being so themselves, have
indivisible entities in them? The result will be the same; if the
sensible entities are divided the others will be divided too, or
else not even the sensible entities can be divided.
But, again, it is not possible that such entities should exist
separately. For if besides the sensible solids there are to be other
solids which are separate from them and prior to the sensible
solids, it is plain that besides the planes also there must be other
and separate planes and points and lines; for consistency requires
this. But if these exist, again besides the planes and lines and
points of the mathematical solid there must be others which are
separate. (For incomposites are prior to compounds; and if there
are, prior to the sensible bodies, bodies which are not sensible, by
the same argument the planes which exist by themselves must be prior
to those which are in the motionless solids. Therefore these will be
planes and lines other than those that exist along with the
mathematical solids to which these thinkers assign separate existence;
for the latter exist along with the mathematical solids, while the
others are prior to the mathematical solids.) Again, therefore,
there will be, belonging to these planes, lines, and prior to them
there will have to be, by the same argument, other lines and points;
and prior to these points in the prior lines there will have to be
other points, though there will be no others prior to these
|
