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. 13)
Verifying relinquishment will be a difficult problem, but not an unsolvable one. We
are fortunate to have already done a lot of relevant work in the context of the
BWC and other treaties. Our major task will be to apply this to technologies that
are naturally much more commercial than military. The substantial need here is
for transparency, as difficulty of verification is directly proportional to the difficulty
of distinguishing relinquished from legitimate activities.
I frankly believe that the situation in 1945 was simpler than the one we now face:
The nuclear technologies were reasonably separable into commercial and military
uses, and monitoring was aided by the nature of atomic tests and the ease with
which radioactivity could be measured. Research on military applications could be
performed at national laboratories such as Los Alamos, with the results kept
secret as long as possible.
The GNR technologies do not divide clearly into commercial and military uses;
given their potential in the market, it's hard to imagine pursuing them only in
national laboratories. With their widespread commercial pursuit, enforcing
relinquishment will require a verification regime similar to that for biological
weapons, but on an unprecedented scale. This, inevitably, will raise tensions
between our individual privacy and desire for proprietary information, and the
need for verification to protect us all
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