Книга только для ознакомления
. 'Animal'
might even be applied to both, not as something definable by one
formula, but as related to a single thing. But this question, while
important for another purpose, is of no importance for the inquiry
into sensible substance; for the essence certainly attaches to the
form and the actuality. For 'soul' and 'to be soul' are the same,
but 'to be man' and 'man' are not the same, unless even the bare
soul is to be called man; and thus on one interpretation the thing
is the same as its essence, and on another it is not.
If we examine we find that the syllable does not consist of the
letters + juxtaposition, nor is the house bricks + juxtaposition.
And this is right; for the juxtaposition or mixing does not consist of
those things of which it is the juxtaposition or mixing. And the
same is true in all other cases; e.g. if the threshold is
characterized by its position, the position is not constituted by
the threshold, but rather the latter is constituted by the former. Nor
is man animal + biped, but there must be something besides these, if
these are matter,-something which is neither an element in the whole
nor a compound, but is the substance; but this people eliminate, and
state only the matter. If, then, this is the cause of the thing's
being, and if the cause of its being is its substance, they will not
be stating the substance itself.
(This, then, must either be eternal or it must be destructible
without being ever in course of being destroyed, and must have come to
be without ever being in course of coming to be
|
