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. But from the premisses this necessarily follows, that
if we actually supposed that which is not, but is capable of being, to
be or to have come to be, there will be nothing impossible in this;
but the result will be impossible, for the measuring of the diagonal
is impossible. For the false and the impossible are not the same; that
you are standing now is false, but that you should be standing is
not impossible.
At the same time it is clear that if, when A is real, B must be
real, then, when A is possible, B also must be possible. For if B need
not be possible, there is nothing to prevent its not being possible.
Now let A be supposed possible. Then, when A was possible, we agreed
that nothing impossible followed if A were supposed to be real; and
then B must of course be real. But we supposed B to be impossible. Let
it be impossible then. If, then, B is impossible, A also must be so.
But the first was supposed impossible; therefore the second also is
impossible. If, then, A is possible, B also will be possible, if
they were so related that if A,is real, B must be real. If, then, A
and B being thus related, B is not possible on this condition, and B
will not be related as was supposed. And if when A is possible, B must
be possible, then if A is real, B also must be real. For to say that B
must be possible, if A is possible, means this, that if A is real both
at the time when and in the way in which it was supposed capable of
being real, B also must then and in that way be real
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