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. Now it is in the latter of these two senses that either the
whole soul or some part of it constitutes the nature of an animal; and
inasmuch as it is the presence of the soul that enables matter to
constitute the animal nature, much more than it is the presence of
matter which so enables the soul, the inquirer into nature is bound on
every ground to treat of the soul rather than of the matter. For
though the wood of which they are made constitutes the couch and the
tripod, it only does so because it is capable of receiving such and
such a form.
What has been said suggests the question, whether it is the whole
soul or only some part of it, the consideration of which comes
within the province of natural science. Now if it be of the whole soul
that this should treat, then there is no place for any other
philosophy beside it. For as it belongs in all cases to one and the
same science to deal with correlated subjects-one and the same
science, for instance, deals with sensation and with the objects of
sense-and as therefore the intelligent soul and the objects of
intellect, being correlated, must belong to one and the same
science, it follows that natural science will have to include the
whole universe in its province. But perhaps it is not the whole
soul, nor all its parts collectively, that constitutes the source of
motion; but there may be one part, identical with that in plants,
which is the source of growth, another, namely the sensory part, which
is the source of change of quality, while still another, and this
not the intellectual part, is the source of locomotion
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