Книга только для ознакомления
. Again, the Forms are patterns
not only sensible things, but of Forms themselves also; i.e. the
genus, as genus of various species, will be so; therefore the same
thing will be pattern and copy.
Again, it would seem impossible that the substance and that of
which it is the substance should exist apart; how, therefore, could
the Ideas, being the substances of things, exist apart? In the Phaedo'
the case is stated in this way-that the Forms are causes both of being
and of becoming; yet when the Forms exist, still the things that share
in them do not come into being, unless there is something to originate
movement; and many other things come into being (e.g. a house or a
ring) of which we say there are no Forms. Clearly, therefore, even the
other things can both be and come into being owing to such causes as
produce the things just mentioned.
Again, if the Forms are numbers, how can they be causes? Is it
because existing things are other numbers, e.g. one number is man,
another is Socrates, another Callias? Why then are the one set of
numbers causes of the other set? It will not make any difference
even if the former are eternal and the latter are not. But if it is
because things in this sensible world (e.g. harmony) are ratios of
numbers, evidently the things between which they are ratios are some
one class of things. If, then, this--the matter--is some definite
thing, evidently the numbers themselves too will be ratios of
something to something else
|
