Книга только для ознакомления
.
And what is thought to be easy-to show that all things are
one-is not done; for what is proved by the method of setting out
instances is not that all things are one but that there is a One
itself,-if we grant all the assumptions. And not even this follows, if
we do not grant that the universal is a genus; and this in some
cases it cannot be.
Nor can it be explained either how the lines and planes and solids
that come after the numbers exist or can exist, or what significance
they have; for these can neither be Forms (for they are not
numbers), nor the intermediates (for those are the objects of
mathematics), nor the perishable things. This is evidently a
distinct fourth class.
In general, if we search for the elements of existing things
without distinguishing the many senses in which things are said to
exist, we cannot find them, especially if the search for the
elements of which things are made is conducted in this manner. For
it is surely impossible to discover what 'acting' or 'being acted on',
or 'the straight', is made of, but if elements can be discovered at
all, it is only the elements of substances; therefore either to seek
the elements of all existing things or to think one has them is
incorrect.
And how could we learn the elements of all things? Evidently we
cannot start by knowing anything before. For as he who is learning
geometry, though he may know other things before, knows none of the
things with which the science deals and about which he is to learn, so
is it in all other cases
|
