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Above all one might discuss the question what on earth the Forms
contribute to sensible things, either to those that are eternal or
to those that come into being and cease to be. For they cause
neither movement nor any change in them. But again they help in no
wise either towards the knowledge of the other things (for they are
not even the substance of these, else they would have been in them),
or towards their being, if they are not in the particulars which share
in them; though if they were, they might be thought to be causes, as
white causes whiteness in a white object by entering into its
composition. But this argument, which first Anaxagoras and later
Eudoxus and certain others used, is very easily upset; for it is not
difficult to collect many insuperable objections to such a view.
But, further, all other things cannot come from the Forms in any
of the usual senses of 'from'. And to say that they are patterns and
the other things share in them is to use empty words and poetical
metaphors. For what is it that works, looking to the Ideas? And
anything can either be, or become, like another without being copied
from it, so that whether Socrates or not a man Socrates like might
come to be; and evidently this might be so even if Socrates were
eternal. And there will be several patterns of the same thing, and
therefore several Forms; e.g. 'animal' and 'two-footed' and also
'man himself' will be Forms of man
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