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Further, according to the assumption on which our belief in the
Ideas rests, there will be Forms not only of substances but also of
many other things (for the concept is single not only in the case of
substances but also in the other cases, and there are sciences not
only of substance but also of other things, and a thousand other
such difficulties confront them). But according to the necessities
of the case and the opinions held about the Forms, if Forms can be
shared in there must be Ideas of substances only. For they are not
shared in incidentally, but a thing must share in its Form as in
something not predicated of a subject (by 'being shared in
incidentally' I mean that e.g. if a thing shares in 'double itself',
it shares also in 'eternal', but incidentally; for 'eternal' happens
to be predicable of the 'double'). Therefore the Forms will be
substance; but the same terms indicate substance in this and in the
ideal world (or what will be the meaning of saying that there is
something apart from the particulars-the one over many?). And if the
Ideas and the particulars that share in them have the same form, there
will be something common to these; for why should '2' be one and the
same in the perishable 2's or in those which are many but eternal, and
not the same in the '2' itself' as in the particular 2? But if they
have not the same form, they must have only the name in common, and it
is as if one were to call both Callias and a wooden image a 'man',
without observing any community between them
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