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. But if its
being essentially a man is to be the same as either being
essentially a not-man or essentially not being a man, then its essence
will be something else. Therefore our opponents must say that there
cannot be such a definition of anything, but that all attributes are
accidental; for this is the distinction between substance and
accident-'white' is accidental to man, because though he is white,
whiteness is not his essence. But if all statements are accidental,
there will be nothing primary about which they are made, if the
accidental always implies predication about a subject. The
predication, then, must go on ad infinitum. But this is impossible;
for not even more than two terms can be combined in accidental
predication. For (1) an accident is not an accident of an accident,
unless it be because both are accidents of the same subject. I mean,
for instance, that the white is musical and the latter is white,
only because both are accidental to man. But (2) Socrates is
musical, not in this sense, that both terms are accidental to
something else. Since then some predicates are accidental in this
and some in that sense, (a) those which are accidental in the latter
sense, in which white is accidental to Socrates, cannot form an
infinite series in the upward direction; e.g. Socrates the white has
not yet another accident; for no unity can be got out of such a sum.
Nor again (b) will 'white' have another term accidental to it, e
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