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. The
starting-point for all such arguments is not the demand that our
opponent shall say that something either is or is not (for this one
might perhaps take to be a begging of the question), but that he shall
say something which is significant both for himself and for another;
for this is necessary, if he really is to say anything. For, if he
means nothing, such a man will not be capable of reasoning, either
with himself or with another. But if any one grants this,
demonstration will be possible; for we shall already have something
definite. The person responsible for the proof, however, is not he who
demonstrates but he who listens; for while disowning reason he listens
to reason. And again he who admits this has admitted that something is
true apart from demonstration (so that not everything will be 'so
and not so').
First then this at least is obviously true, that the word 'be'
or 'not be' has a definite meaning, so that not everything will be 'so
and not so'. Again, if 'man' has one meaning, let this be
'two-footed animal'; by having one meaning I understand this:-if 'man'
means 'X', then if A is a man 'X' will be what 'being a man' means for
him. (It makes no difference even if one were to say a word has
several meanings, if only they are limited in number; for to each
definition there might be assigned a different word. For instance,
we might say that 'man' has not one meaning but several, one of
which would have one definition, viz
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