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. 'two-footed animal', while there
might be also several other definitions if only they were limited in
number; for a peculiar name might be assigned to each of the
definitions. If, however, they were not limited but one were to say
that the word has an infinite number of meanings, obviously
reasoning would be impossible; for not to have one meaning is to
have no meaning, and if words have no meaning our reasoning with one
another, and indeed with ourselves, has been annihilated; for it is
impossible to think of anything if we do not think of one thing; but
if this is possible, one name might be assigned to this thing.)
Let it be assumed then, as was said at the beginning, that the
name has a meaning and has one meaning; it is impossible, then, that
'being a man' should mean precisely 'not being a man', if 'man' not
only signifies something about one subject but also has one
significance (for we do not identify 'having one significance' with
'signifying something about one subject', since on that assumption
even 'musical' and 'white' and 'man' would have had one
significance, so that all things would have been one; for they would
all have had the same significance).
And it will not be possible to be and not to be the same thing,
except in virtue of an ambiguity, just as if one whom we call 'man',
others were to call 'not-man'; but the point in question is not
this, whether the same thing can at the same time be and not be a
man in name, but whether it can in fact
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