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.e. of the essence), or of
the compound of the form and the matter, or of the matter itself.
But only the parts of the form are parts of the formula, and the
formula is of the universal; for 'being a circle' is the same as the
circle, and 'being a soul' the same as the soul. But when we come to
the concrete thing, e.g. this circle, i.e. one of the individual
circles, whether perceptible or intelligible (I mean by intelligible
circles the mathematical, and by perceptible circles those of bronze
and of wood),-of these there is no definition, but they are known by
the aid of intuitive thinking or of perception; and when they pass out
of this complete realization it is not clear whether they exist or
not; but they are always stated and recognized by means of the
universal formula. But matter is unknowable in itself. And some matter
is perceptible and some intelligible, perceptible matter being for
instance bronze and wood and all matter that is changeable, and
intelligible matter being that which is present in perceptible
things not qua perceptible, i.e. the objects of mathematics.
We have stated, then, how matters stand with regard to whole and
part, and their priority and posteriority. But when any one asks
whether the right angle and the circle and the animal are prior, or
the things into which they are divided and of which they consist, i.e.
the parts, we must meet the inquiry by saying that the question cannot
be answered simply
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