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. For if even bare soul is the animal or the
living thing, or the soul of each individual is the individual itself,
and 'being a circle' is the circle, and 'being a right angle' and
the essence of the right angle is the right angle, then the whole in
one sense must be called posterior to the art in one sense, i.e. to
the parts included in the formula and to the parts of the individual
right angle (for both the material right angle which is made of
bronze, and that which is formed by individual lines, are posterior to
their parts); while the immaterial right angle is posterior to the
parts included in the formula, but prior to those included in the
particular instance, and the question must not be answered simply. If,
however, the soul is something different and is not identical with the
animal, even so some parts must, as we have maintained, be called
prior and others must not.
11
Another question is naturally raised, viz. what sort of parts
belong to the form and what sort not to the form, but to the
concrete thing. Yet if this is not plain it is not possible to
define any thing; for definition is of the universal and of the
form. If then it is not evident what sort of parts are of the nature
of matter and what sort are not, neither will the formula of the thing
be evident. In the case of things which are found to occur in
specifically different materials, as a circle may exist in bronze or
stone or wood, it seems plain that these, the bronze or the stone, are
no part of the essence of the circle, since it is found apart from
them
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