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Further, substance means that which is not predicable of a
subject, but the universal is predicable of some subject always.
But perhaps the universal, while it cannot be substance in the way
in which the essence is so, can be present in this; e.g. 'animal'
can be present in 'man' and 'horse'. Then clearly it is a formula of
the essence. And it makes no difference even if it is not a formula of
everything that is in the substance; for none the less the universal
will be the substance of something, as 'man' is the substance of the
individual man in whom it is present, so that the same result will
follow once more; for the universal, e.g. 'animal', will be the
substance of that in which it is present as something peculiar to
it. And further it is impossible and absurd that the 'this', i.e.
the substance, if it consists of parts, should not consist of
substances nor of what is a 'this', but of quality; for that which
is not substance, i.e. the quality, will then be prior to substance
and to the 'this'. Which is impossible; for neither in formula nor
in time nor in coming to be can the modifications be prior to the
substance; for then they will also be separable from it. Further,
Socrates will contain a substance present in a substance, so that this
will be the substance of two things. And in general it follows, if man
and such things are substance, that none of the elements in their
formulae is the substance of anything, nor does it exist apart from
the species or in anything else; I mean, for instance, that no
'animal' exists apart from the particular kinds of animal, nor does
any other of the elements present in formulae exist apart
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