Книга только для ознакомления
.
If, then, we view the matter from these standpoints, it is plain
that no universal attribute is a substance, and this is plain also
from the fact that no common predicate indicates a 'this', but
rather a 'such'. If not, many difficulties follow and especially the
'third man'.
The conclusion is evident also from the following consideration. A
substance cannot consist of substances present in it in complete
reality; for things that are thus in complete reality two are never in
complete reality one, though if they are potentially two, they can
be one (e.g. the double line consists of two halves-potentially; for
the complete realization of the halves divides them from one another);
therefore if the substance is one, it will not consist of substances
present in it and present in this way, which Democritus describes
rightly; he says one thing cannot be made out of two nor two out of
one; for he identifies substances with his indivisible magnitudes.
It is clear therefore that the same will hold good of number, if
number is a synthesis of units, as is said by some; for two is
either not one, or there is no unit present in it in complete reality.
But our result involves a difficulty. If no substance can consist of
universals because a universal indicates a 'such', not a 'this', and
if no substance can be composed of substances existing in complete
reality, every substance would be incomposite, so that there would not
even be a formula of any substance
|
