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. But it is thought by all and was
stated long ago that it is either only, or primarily, substance that
can defined; yet now it seems that not even substance can. There
cannot, then, be a definition of anything; or in a sense there can be,
and in a sense there cannot. And what we are saying will be plainer
from what follows.
14
It is clear also from these very facts what consequence
confronts those who say the Ideas are substances capable of separate
existence, and at the same time make the Form consist of the genus and
the differentiae. For if the Forms exist and 'animal' is present in
'man' and 'horse', it is either one and the same in number, or
different. (In formula it is clearly one; for he who states the
formula will go through the formula in either case.) If then there
is a 'man-in-himself' who is a 'this' and exists apart, the parts also
of which he consists, e.g. 'animal' and 'two-footed', must indicate
'thises', and be capable of separate existence, and substances;
therefore 'animal', as well as 'man', must be of this sort.
Now (1) if the 'animal' in 'the horse' and in 'man' is one and the
same, as you are with yourself, (a) how will the one in things that
exist apart be one, and how will this 'animal' escape being divided
even from itself?
Further, (b) if it is to share in 'two-footed' and
'many-footed', an impossible conclusion follows; for contrary
attributes will belong at the same time to it although it is one and a
'this'
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