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The primary contrariety is that between positive state and
privation-not every privation, however (for 'privation' has several
meanings), but that which is complete. And the other contraries must
be called so with reference to these, some because they possess these,
others because they produce or tend to produce them, others because
they are acquisitions or losses of these or of other contraries. Now
if the kinds of opposition are contradiction and privation and
contrariety and relation, and of these the first is contradiction, and
contradiction admits of no intermediate, while contraries admit of
one, clearly contradiction and contrariety are not the same. But
privation is a kind of contradiction; for what suffers privation,
either in general or in some determinate way, either that which is
quite incapable of having some attribute or that which, being of
such a nature as to have it, has it not; here we have already a
variety of meanings, which have been distinguished elsewhere.
Privation, therefore, is a contradiction or incapacity which is
determinate or taken along with the receptive material. This is the
reason why, while contradiction does not admit of an intermediate,
privation sometimes does; for everything is equal or not equal, but
not everything is equal or unequal, or if it is, it is only within the
sphere of that which is receptive of equality. If, then, the
comings-to-be which happen to the matter start from the contraries,
and proceed either from the form and the possession of the form or
from a privation of the form or shape, clearly all contrariety must be
privation, but presumably not all privation is contrariety (the reason
being that that has suffered privation may have suffered it in several
ways); for it is only the extremes from which changes proceed that are
contraries
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