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. One, then, will be in virtue
of its own nature one sort of animal, and the other another, e.g.
one a horse and the other a man. This difference, then, must be an
otherness of the genus. For I give the name of 'difference in the
genus' an otherness which makes the genus itself other.
This, then, will be a contrariety (as can be shown also by
induction). For all things are divided by opposites, and it has been
proved that contraries are in the same genus. For contrariety was seen
to be complete difference; and all difference in species is a
difference from something in something; so that this is the same for
both and is their genus. (Hence also all contraries which are
different in species and not in genus are in the same line of
predication, and other than one another in the highest degree-for
the difference is complete-, and cannot be present along with one
another.) The difference, then, is a contrariety.
This, then, is what it is to be 'other in species'-to have a
contrariety, being in the same genus and being indivisible (and
those things are the same in species which have no contrariety,
being indivisible); we say 'being indivisible', for in the process
of division contrarieties arise in the intermediate stages before we
come to the indivisibles. Evidently, therefore, with reference to that
which is called the genus, none of the species-of-a-genus is either
the same as it or other than it in species (and this is fitting; for
the matter is indicated by negation, and the genus is the matter of
that of which it is called the genus, not in the sense in which we
speak of the genus or family of the Heraclidae, but in that in which
the genus is an element in a thing's nature), nor is it so with
reference to things which are not in the same genus, but it will
differ in genus from them, and in species from things in the same
genus
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