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. This also, then, will come between the contraries. All
the other intermediates also, therefore, are composite; for that which
has more of a quality than one thing and less than another is
compounded somehow out of the things than which it is said to have
more and less respectively of the quality. And since there are no
other things prior to the contraries and homogeneous with the
intermediates, all intermediates must be compounded out of the
contraries. Therefore also all the inferior classes, both the
contraries and their intermediates, will be compounded out of the
primary contraries. Clearly, then, intermediates are (1) all in the
same genus and (2) intermediate between contraries, and (3) all
compounded out of the contraries.
8
That which is other in species is other than something in
something, and this must belong to both; e.g. if it is an animal other
in species, both are animals. The things, then, which are other in
species must be in the same genus. For by genus I mean that one
identical thing which is predicated of both and is differentiated in
no merely accidental way, whether conceived as matter or otherwise.
For not only must the common nature attach to the different things,
e.g. not only must both be animals, but this very animality must
also be different for each (e.g. in the one case equinity, in the
other humanity), and so this common nature is specifically different
for each from what it is for the other
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