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. Therefore it follows that all attributes that
are proved must belong to a single class; for all demonstrative
sciences use the axioms.
But if the science of substance and the science which deals with
the axioms are different, which of them is by nature more
authoritative and prior? The axioms are most universal and are
principles of all things. And if it is not the business of the
philosopher, to whom else will it belong to inquire what is true and
what is untrue about them?
(3) In general, do all substances fall under one science or
under more than one? If the latter, to what sort of substance is the
present science to be assigned?-On the other hand, it is not
reasonable that one science should deal with all. For then there would
be one demonstrative science dealing with all attributes. For ever
demonstrative science investigates with regard to some subject its
essential attributes, starting from the common beliefs. Therefore to
investigate the essential attributes of one class of things,
starting from one set of beliefs, is the business of one science.
For the subject belongs to one science, and the premisses belong to
one, whether to the same or to another; so that the attributes do so
too, whether they are investigated by these sciences or by one
compounded out of them.
(5) Further, does our investigation deal with substances alone
or also with their attributes? I mean for instance, if the solid is
a substance and so are lines and planes, is it the business of the
same science to know these and to know the attributes of each of these
classes (the attributes about which the mathematical sciences offer
proofs), or of a different science? If of the same, the science of
substance also must be a demonstrative science, but it is thought that
there is no demonstration of the essence of things
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