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Further, both those who say there are several elements of corporeal
things and those who say there is one, say the parts of which bodies
are compounded and consist are principles; e.g. Empedocles says fire
and water and the rest are the constituent elements of things, but
does not describe these as genera of existing things. Besides this, if
we want to examine the nature of anything else, we examine the parts
of which, e.g. a bed consists and how they are put together, and
then we know its nature.
To judge from these arguments, then, the principles of things
would not be the genera; but if we know each thing by its
definition, and the genera are the principles or starting-points of
definitions, the genera must also be the principles of definable
things. And if to get the knowledge of the species according to
which things are named is to get the knowledge of things, the genera
are at least starting-points of the species. And some also of those
who say unity or being, or the great and the small, are elements of
things, seem to treat them as genera.
But, again, it is not possible to describe the principles in
both ways. For the formula of the essence is one; but definition by
genera will be different from that which states the constituent
parts of a thing.
(7) Besides this, even if the genera are in the highest degree
principles, should one regard the first of the genera as principles,
or those which are predicated directly of the individuals? This also
admits of dispute
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